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Abstract:
The discussion regarding STM has been accelerated due to the US policy decision of taking the lead
of international discussion in Space Policy Directive 3 (SPD3). It is necessary to solve the following
3 issues to install STM in global sphere; the SSA data sharing; space debris mitigation management;
and traffic management regulations.
This paper will be focusing on the 3rd issue, traffic management regulations, and firstly describe the
reason of inherent reluctance of States to control the outer space based on the fundamental principle
of international space law. The States sovereignty is always the dominant in the territorial area of land,
sea or air space and that dominance provides them their incentives to regulate and control the area. To
the contrary, the outer space is not entitled to State sovereignty, because of the prohibition of State
appropriation by the Outer Space Treaty, thus States will not bear costs and responsibilities to control
that area likewise the other territorial area. This legal nature of the outer space consists the cause of
embarrassment among the space community to stepping into regulating the area. Based on this
circumstance in regulatory field, this paper will aim to reiterate the necessity of consolidating technical
best practices of current operators as a bottom-up approach for forming decent international regulatory
criteria. The paper will also touch upon the recent STM discussions in Japanese space community
confounded by the embarrassment of the international community.
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1. Introduction
Constituting a proper system for managing space traffic internationally is becoming a crucial
topic in the congested, contested and competitive circumstances of the outer space today. It is in this
context that the concept of Space Traffic Management (STM) has been illuminated in this couple of
years. There are mainly three issues for realizing STM in the international field; establish common
space situational awareness (SSA) database for space operations, common rules for sharing on-orbit
maneuver information, traffic management rules for collision avoidance, and responsibility and
liability rules against breach of the common rules. 1 The necessity of rules and regulations for
establishing STM in global level are discussed and recognized worldwide, though almost all of the
international initiatives ended without fulfilling its goals.2 At this stage, it is important to settle down
from the politics and explore the legal background that this issue retains. This paper tries to illuminate
the paradox lying on the principle of international space law for realizing global STM and explain
another reason of the effectiveness or indispensability of bottom-up approach. This paper aims to
encourage operators, notably the industries, to take important role of rule-making for global STM as
it is not played in the main field of public players likewise the other areas.

2. Paradox in International Space Law
The STM discussion, to date, seems to be frustrated because the elements of the issue have almost
been talked out with multiple possible technical solutions, but few policy advancement or action is
going ahead. Of course, there are overwhelming political issues lying on the process of arranging
necessary circumstances for STM. Establishing common SSA data sharing mechanism cannot be
realized without heavy political debates for common data policy to let national security sectors
exchanging data. Major space debris mitigation measures have already been conducted by most of the
existing operators and discussions to strengthen their rules are ongoing in international fora in multiple
levels without any consensus so far. Traffic management regulation discussion engaged both in
international political sphere and technical community.3 Every element is on-going, but nothing has
been decided yet. This sense of stagnation might be the source of frustration. However, instead of
leaving this as an emotionally charged issue, this paper tries to adjoin a logical explanation from the
perspective of international law. Namely, in this context, it is necessary to reexplore the nature of the
principle of international space law as it conduce inherent reluctance of area control in outer space.
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The Outer Space Treaty (OST)4 does not explicitly regulate traffic rules in outer space. It simply
prescribes the freedom of exploration and use of the area by all States (Art. 1) and try to control the
limitation to that freedom by ex-posto facto responsibilities of States to the damages including those
resulted by non-State actors’ activities. It is true that the State Parties have obligations to inform any
phenomena they discovered in outer space that could constitute a danger to the life or health of
astronauts (Art. 5) or any identifying data of the object in case of return to the State of registry (Art.
8). States are also obliged to provide general information of the nature, conduct, locations and results
of space activities for maintaining transparency (Art. 11) and to consult with other State of possible
harmfully interfered activity (Art. 9). However, there are no obligation of information sharing,
notification requirements or traffic management rules that OST requires the State Parties to engage. It
is reasonable to understand, at least, that the Article 9 of OST can serve as the legal basis for STM
since it establishes a consultation mechanism in case of potentially interfering activities before
conducting such activities. Although, there are no concrete case exercising this Article to date. Rather,
the reality is that there is no consensus understanding on the legal responsibility of space debris.5 More
than half of the century have passed without any modification of space treaties based on the common
benefits of major space powers to maintain the liberty of activities on the current outer space
circumstances.
The other efforts, during this half century, of elaborating the norms of space treaties by using soft
laws seems to achieve certain meaningful value. 6 Those non-legally binding instruments can be
classed in 2 types. One is introducing a common understanding of existing prescriptions of the treaties
to redefine them in contemporary context. The “Application of the concept of the ‘launching State’”7
or the “Recommendations on enhancing the practice of States and international intergovernmental
organizations in registering space objects”8 are this type of recommendations. The other type is the set
of guidelines for practice. The “Space debris mitigation guidelines of the Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space”9 or the “Recommendations on
national legislation relevant to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space”10 are this type of
recommendations. Those soft laws certainly fostered communal sense of the issues in governmental
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level and helped exploring its international discussions or raising momentum of developing relevant
technical standards. It is also certain, unfortunately, that they did not served as sufficient rules for
STM. Therefore, no rules have been applied into outer space traffic to date.
This seesaw history of governing the outer space can be seen as an evidence of reluctant attitude
of States to control the area. Looking from a different perspective, through a comparative analysis
with other areas of traffic management, a further structural factor appears as the reason of that reluctant
attitude. The reason is based on the fundamental principles of international space law, namely the nonappropriation of the outer space by States (OST art. 2). Table 1 shows the relation of State sovereignty
and traffic control in the areas of ground, maritime, aviation and outer space. Two significant
differences appearing in this comparison emboss the reason.
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(Table 1: State sovereignty in managing traffic)

Firstly, the jurisdiction of States does not apply to the area but only to the object functioning in
the area. In the other area, jurisdiction applies on their respective territorial ground, sea, or air space,
which are connected to international areas. International areas are not subject to State jurisdiction, of
course, but its physical connection to their territorial areas delivered States’ incentives to be aware of
the situation and hopefully exercise certain affect in those areas. This is because those connecting
areas will be a virtual buffer zone for preparing against possible threats to their borders. In this context,
traffic management becomes a practical tool of awareness of the area while maintaining their order.
This is why every State bare their own costs of maintaining their personnel or equipment for traffic
control of those areas. The structure of air traffic control using Flight Information Region is applied
to the air space above the high seas using solely the resources of the coastal states as the assignment
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coordinated at the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).11 The World-Wide Navigation
Warning Services for sea vessels on the high seas are assigned to 21 States as NAVAREA
Coordinators allocated by International Maritime Organization (IMO) and International Hydrographic
Organization (IHO) operated by the resources of those states.12 This tool can be used not only for
controlling their territorial areas, but also for affecting their connecting international areas by aware
the situation and maintain orders. In outer space, on the other hand, OST permanently drives the
control of State sovereignty from the area, and to this reflection, the incentives of the State to bare cost
for maintaining the order of traffic in that area is also eliminated.
Secondly, there are no sanction to non-registered object traveling in the outer space. In the other
areas of ground, sea or air space, non-registered vehicle is subject to certain sanctions. Vessels or
aircrafts are required to be registered to a State and show its flag or aircraft registration number for
physical identification. This is a measure for recognizing those vehicles for protection of the State of
registry, but at the same time, a measure to rely on the State of registry to regulate the registered
vehicle in consistent with the relevant international regulations. Namely, the system of maintaining
the order of maritime traffic or air traffic ensuring smooth and safety operation is functioning by using
the States regulations as effective tool for control. Vehicles that are not registered by any States are
subject to international sanctions such as denial of providing navigation or information necessary for
operation, or other enforcement measures. Non-registered vessels on the high seas can be lawfully
inspected or captured by military ship. Those legal system leads the operators’ incentives to register
their vehicle, because non-registration turns to make against their benefit. In outer space there is a
registration mechanism, likewise the other area, established by the Registration Convention13, but no
obligation for physical identification and no sanction or disadvantage for non-registered object. The
legal effect of space object registration is solely of retaining jurisdiction and right of control14 and no
other effects was established including certain known national legislation. If a State consider
discouraging the operators of non-registered object, one can establish a piece of legislation sanctioning
non-registered object at least in their own jurisdiction, but none of those legislation appearing to date.
In this conclusion, non-registered space object is not subject to any sanction under the current legal
system, which reduce the incentives of operators to register their space objects.
It is therefore, the fundamental principle of international space law decreasing the motivation of
States as regulators and as well as that of operators as complying actors. In consequence, from
international legal perspective, outer space is constructively reluctant domain to control and this nature
increase difficulties to reach consensus among States. Therefore, at least theoretically, there is no
exaggeration to say that the international legal nature of the outer space serves as a barrier to form the
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similar controlling system to the other area of land, sea or airspace. One should be admitted that it is
on the basic principle of international space law that the hesitation or neglect of establishing a common
legal standard for controlling the outer space as an organized area. As far the legitimate authority of
international law is the State sovereignty, the hesitation of changing space treaties is also the hesitation
of the law makers of international law. It is of course entirely dependent on the political will of the
present States, but recognizing that the States are self-serving presence, that nature is enough as an
explanation why rule making for the outer space is progressing at a snail’s pace. Therefore, there is no
exaggeration to say at this stage that it is logically non-sense of waiting the action of States.15

3. Bottom-up Approach as the Keystone
It is therefore solely the operators that have the incentives to establish regulation on the outer
space operations for the sake of safety. It is because the operators are the only receiver of following
two demerits of the chaotic circumstances of space operation.
The first reason is fairly economic reason as most of the entire operators will bear into mind. The
circumstances without traffic management will be the world without operation standard for safety
maneuver. This signify that the standard responsibility of who bears what will remain uncertain. The
operator that have to maintain their space assets’ safety will try to hedge those uncertain risks, with
disassembled logics of measuring their risks. As its corollary, operators hedge their risks excessively
or based on under estimation. This miss assignment of necessary cost of safety operation brings false
economy to the entire operators’ market.
The second reason is lying on the possibility of changing legal standard of the criteria of fault
liability. On-orbit accident will be evaluated based on fault liability of the caused party. The standard
criteria for fault liability will be evaluated based on the standard of professional operation, but that
standard may be changed gradually based on the advancement of technical maturity. If a higher
standard of safety operation that the operators may take through reasonable cost, required standard for
recognizing fault liability will also be raised accordingly. For instance, if a paid data providing service
becomes standard operation among the operators, denial use of that service will may be considered as
liable because of its failure of using standard tool. Therefore, industrial best practice retains the basis
of becoming de facto standard. This marks the operators’ incentives to be front runners of rulemaking
of safety operation in outer space. This is also the conception of the necessity of an international STM
regime as a technical standard or guidelines rather than an abrupt hard law.

4. STM Discussion in Japan
Japan see itself as a part of space faring nations based on the historical fact of successfully
launched its satellite to the outer space as the 4th country in the world. On the other hand, comparing
to the wealth allocated to space activities, annual launches or the number of emerging space companies,
Yu Takeuchi, “Necessity of Establishing International Space Governance by an International
Regime for Space Traffic Management (STM)”, Hogaku seijigaku ronkyu (Journal of law and political
studies), vol.120, Graduate School of Law at Keio University, to be published in March 2019.
15
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one should be admitted that Japan is a middle power comparing to the major space power as US,
Europe or China. It is not only because of its character as a middle power, but also the situation of the
outer space politics, which are remaining strongly in the age of the cold war, affects the behavior of
major player of Japanese space community to sit on the fence on the US policy decisions. Their current
confusion regarding STM is based on the wandering and unfocused international discussion. However,
as mentioned in the previous section, this paper would also like to serve as a push to Japanese space
community to join the international discussion for producing a bottom-up approach forming industrial
best practice.
Meanwhile, discussion regarding STM in Japan has been gradually emerged in this couple of
years. The government has been mandated from 2018 by the Basic Plan for Space Policy to consider
future framework for STM. It seemed overwhelming of discussing the entire STM policy, the
government started its discussion in a specific topic of third-party liability for on-orbit damage. The
consideration held in a branch of the Committee on National Space Policy namely the Sub-Committee
of Space Legislation from September to December 2018. The final report of the Sub-Committee finds
that the national legislation have to be in line with the business development within the Japanese
jurisdiction which is not matured enough to identify the necessary legislative elements. Although, the
report appropriately summarized the issue from legal perspective as 2 dimensions. Protection of the
victims of the accident and preservation of the environment of the outer space. The report illuminated
the theoretical possibility of national legislation based on those public interests and considered several
possible solutions of diversification of the risk to those interests. The most affordable solution is to
retain the services of insurance likewise the system of the United Kingdom established by its Space
Industry Act16. The report concluded, based on the actual immaturity of Japanese industries, that the
national legislation has to be at the timing of the fact benefitted by the legislation appearing together.
Therefore, the report did not suggest an immediate legislation for on-orbit third party liability, but it
recognized its practical beneficial when needed.
Furthermore, some of the Japanese industries are making more proactive actions. A Japanese
space company Astroscale running a business for providing sustainability of space activities is taking
an important role in the Consortium for Execution of Rendezvous and Servicing Operations
(CONFERS), which is fostering standards for safe satellite operations. 17 Bottom up approach for
establishing technical standard or guidelines for safety operation is the first step to realize worldwide
STM, as mentioned in the previous section, CONFERS’s activity is further substantial than
governmental activities. Some of the Japanese industries are also taking part with the discussions in
the Global Future Council on Space Technologies at the World Economic Forum. This activity is to
incentivize private companies to move for solving space debris problem from an economic approach.18
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This is also a seed of bottom up approach for a technical standard.
Another activity started from October 2018 is a Study Group for STM. This is an activity started
jointly by the Institute of Space Law at Keio University and Legal Affairs Division of JAXA as a study
group solely for learning and improving understanding through discussion. Since the potential issues
and tasks of STM are too deep to understand the issue at glance, it will be valuable to discuss and
exchange the views among the relevant experts as a learning process. The Study Group aims to provide
a ground of Chatham House rule based discussion for deepen the understanding among the participants.
The Group is receiving diverse participation from academia, private sectors and public sectors and
serves as networking platform too. The discussion started by sharing awareness of the necessity of
STM at global level and flowing down the issue to the elements that have to be considered. Participants
are expected to take actions back in their own entities as the Group will not take the role of unifying
the actions but being a standing community.

5. Conclusion
This paper find out that it is one of the fundamental principles of international space law
disrupting the State behavior of area control in the outer space. Since it is the basis of the current
framework of space activities and politics, it is more reasonable to rely on the bottom-up approach for
fulfilling the startup of rule-making process of global STM rather than waiting the actions of public
sector. From this stand point, this paper would like to serve as an encouragement of the private
operators to commit into the rule-making process, or even more consort a de facto process for bottom
up necessary rules for safety operations. Engaging the community for this direction will become
beneficial for the entire future space community. Sharing the spirit of “progress through collaboration”
have to be the key for achieving global STM.
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